public as unethical. Even a partial list of organizations that have fallen into near financial ruin and ethical disgrace as a result of unethical decisions made during times of crisis will highlight the seriousness of the problem; think of Morton-Thiokol, Firestone, Ford, Union Carbide, General Motors, and Jack in the Box, for starters. Other organizations have faced crises and won with their reputations enhanced-Johnson & Johnson and Malden Mills come to mind. Clearly, addressing crises and potential crises can be a difficult, ongoing, and ever-changing journey for today's organizations, with few guides to help improve decisions made under the pressure of crises. As Mitroff, Shrivastava, and Udwadia (1987) stated, "Corporate crises are disasters" (p. 283) . But what factors come into play to influence whether the decisions made in crisis situations will be ethical or not and will be disasters or not? What guides can be found to help managers and other leaders preserve ethical decision making during crises?
The study of organizational crisis and crisis management is in the early stages of development but is of increasing importance as organizational environments become increasingly complex, turbulent, and interdependent. These environmental effects are heightened by the tightly coupled, interactive, and complex nature of modern organizations and technology (Greening & Johnson, 1997; Perrow, 1984) . Much of the emphasis in the crisis management field has been on understanding causes of crisis and designing methods of managing crisis events in a successful manner. A literature is building on how organizations respond to different types of crisis (Mitroff et al., 1987; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993 ) and on organizational decision making under conditions of crisis (see Dutton, 1986; Greening & Johnson, 1997; Smart & Vertinsky, 1977) . Until recently, there had been little work on ethics in decision making under conditions of crisis, although Falkenberg and Herremans (1995) did study the effects of formal and informal control systems and included a crisis scenario. Participants in that study stated that in crisis situations, they lost sight of even formal policies of the organization and made decisions based simply on what they thought was necessary for organizational survival (Falkenberg & Herremans, 1995, p. 140) . Bowen and Power (1993) , in their discussion of the necessity of ongoing communication for ethical behavior, noted that engaging in stakeholder dialogues is especially important in crisis situations. Neither of these studies was focused directly on ethical decision making during crisis. Seeger and Ulmer (2001) explored virtue ethics, leadership, and crisis management through two leadership case studies and found a set of postcrisis virtues but did not suggest ways in which these virtues could be made part of a decision model. In addition to these works, there has also been for some time a recognition that situation, or context, is important in understanding the ethical decision-making process in organizations (Trevino, 1986 (Trevino, , 1992 , and Jones's (1991) issue-contingent model of ethical decision making has been the basis of research on moral intensity, some of which can be applied to crisis situations. With crisis conditions ever more likely as technological advances and environmental change continue at a rapid pace and the complexity of modern industrial and knowledge-based economies lead to increased vulnerability, however, crisis and its potential effects on ethical decision making become more important to understand.
This article addresses ethical decision making in times of crisis and develops a framework for understanding crisis effects that highlights threats to ethical decision making resulting from the stress that is inherent in crises. We identify factors present at the individual, organizational, and event levels that influence the decision-making process in organizations during crisis, and we offer propositions that predict relationships among those factors. We contend that a key aspect in overcoming the effects of stress on effective and ethical decision making in times of crisis is the inclusion of multiple points of view.
DEFINITIONS

Crisis
Crisis is defined variously in the literature, but Pearson and Clair (1998) provided a good general definition:
An organizational crisis is a low-probability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of the organization and is characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made swiftly. (p. 60) The urgency aspect of crisis is not accepted by all in the field. Some argue that crisis issues can be ongoing (Ashmos, Duchon, & Bodensteiner, 1997) or can be anticipated and planned for (Billings, Milburn, & Schaalman, 1980 ) and therefore should not be defined temporally. There is, however, widespread acknowledgment that under conditions of crisis, swift decisions are perceived to be a necessity (Billings et al., 1980; Dutton, 1986; Greening & Johnson, 1997) .
Most of the work in the field of organizational crisis has looked at crisis as the single event described by Pearson and Clair (1998) . Some have categorized crises into discrete crises (sudden, low-probability or high-impact events) and continuous crises (situations that evolve over a long period and the impact of which appears at a later time) (Siomkos, 1992) , but both categories refer to a single event. These events may originate in the natural environment or be induced by humans (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993) . Such crises may be typed along two dimensions (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993) : (a) They may be perceived as technical/economic in origin, or human/social; and (b) they may originate through relatively normal everyday events, or have aberrant or deviant causes (p. 51). Examples of such crises are the Exxon/Valdez oil spill, the Bhopal Union Carbide plant disaster, and the Tylenol product-tampering incident. Crises may also be categorized as internal or external, depending on whether they arise from within the organization or without (Mitroff et al., 1987) . An example of an internal human/social crisis might be the Texaco or Denny's sexual harassment cases. An example of an external human/social crisis is terrorism-something Americans are all far more familiar with after 9/11. An internal technical/economic crisis might be the Three Mile Island or Chernobyl accident, whereas an external technical/economic crisis would be the fire at Malden Mills. (See Mitroff et al., 1987 , for detailed descriptions of these crisis types.) These crisis typologies can be used to help explain the stresses that crisis brings to organizations and individuals.
Crisis events may not happen singly, however. Indeed, some researchers (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993) have found that it may be normal for many crises to occur simultaneously or in a chain reaction (p. 52). When this occurs over a prolonged period, we can speak of an organization in crisis. These organizations are facing environmental conditions that are in continuous turmoil, throwing crisis after crisis at the organization over a long period of time, creating constant stresses for management and employees. Examples of organizations in crisis might include Chrysler or General Motors in the 1970s and 1980s; many banking and savings and loan institutions in the 1980s; United Airlines and others after September 11, 2001; many accounting firms in the wake of recent audit scandals; and many state institutions such as universities that are facing continuous and increasing budget cutbacks. In many of these cases, had the challenges been spaced widely enough apart, the organizations might not have entered into crisis; but the events hit them one after another, giving the organizations little time for coping with the previous event. Note that organizations in crisis might be facing crises arising from both external and internal sources, and these differing sources might exacerbate the ongoing crisis events faced by these organizations.
Crises, whether discrete events or ongoing and whatever their origins, are "devices of change" (Hermann, 1963) . It is important to remember that change does not necessarily result in negative consequences. Some crises have resulted in seemingly altruistic behavior on the part of organizations (such as the Tylenol case), and some crises have brought about needed organizational change (Carroll, 1993) . Although crises may be "disasters" (Mitroff et al., 1987) , they do not need to bring about unethical decision making. In some instances, crises might even change the organization's decision structure so that ethical decisions are the more likely result in the normal course of events.
Ethical Decision
The focus of this article, threats to ethical decision making in crisis situations, requires a definition of an ethical decision (as opposed to an unethical decision). An ethical decision is defined as a decision in which all stakeholders have been accorded intrinsic value by the decision maker. This is a process definition of ethics. There are some advantages to using this definition: (a) When it is extremely difficult to get consensus on specific outcomes required by ethics (e.g., level of pay, benefits, and safety for employees), it is easier to get consensus on process (e.g., what should be considered in determining level of pay and other factors, and how that consideration should take place). There will be controversy here as well, but it is more manageable. (In Jones's [1980] discussion of a parallel problem with identifying corporate social responsibility, he observed that "it is virtually impossible to define social responsibility in terms of specific decisions" [p. 65] and asserted that corporate behavior should be judged not by actual decisions made, but by the process that led to those decisions.) (b) Ethics principles, codes, and training cannot anticipate most, and certainly cannot anticipate all, ethical questions. They can, however, provide processes for ethical decision making. (c) It is easier to monitor and sanction processes than it is to evaluate the ethics of the resulting decisions. A focus on process makes the institutionalization of a commitment to ethics more promising than does an attempt to list the decisions that should be made. We believe that this process definition of ethical decision making is practical and defensible.
Furthermore, this definition of an ethical decision, a decision in which all stakeholders have been accorded intrinsic value by the decision maker, although not often used in the literature, is consistent with some. For example, in their discussion of "Kantian Capitalism," Evan and Freeman (1988) argued that stakeholders have the right to participate in decisions that affect them and the right to not be used merely as means to the organization's ends (p. 103). This right belongs by nature to each stakeholder, so it is intrinsic. Bowie (1998) Kernisky (1997) found, with regard to corporate messages, that those that incorporate the widest range of perspectives (stakeholders) are rated higher in legitimacy and ethicality (p. 851). Schaefer (1984) argued that to be truly ethical, a business decision must take into account the interests of all parties who might be affected by the decision. Bowen and Power (1993) defined a moral manager as one willing to engage in fair and open dialogue with all interested stakeholders, toward a goal of genuine consensus. Bowen and Power (1993) suggested that when the situation does not allow an actual dialogue to take place, the moral manager will engage in an imaginary dialogue to ensure that all perspectives are considered. Our definition does not require that each stakeholder claim be satisfied, only (minimally) that the stakeholder is given explicit consideration and that the decision to not satisfy the stakeholder claim can be justified by the decision maker.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND PROPOSITIONS
The Basic Framework
We have defined an ethical decision as one that accords intrinsic value to all stakeholders. When all stakeholders are not explicitly considered, a decision is by our definition not ethical. We have defined crises as events that are ambiguous, threaten organizational survival, have high impact, and are characterized by time pressures. Our framework for the analysis of ethics in crisis decision making starts with the actual crisis and its characteristics, moves to organizational and individual stresses that result from crisis events, and then moves to the behavioral effects of crisis-related stress-its effects on ethical and unethical decision making (see Figure 1) . We argue that due to crisis-caused organizational and individual stress and its effects, stakeholders tend not to be considered and, therefore, unethical decision making is more likely. This relationship between crisis-imposed stress and the narrowing of stakeholder consideration is the basis of our first proposition.
We argue that crisis has effects that create or increase organizational and individual stress and that these effects reduce the ability of the Christensen / ETHICAL DECISION MAKING 333 decision maker to be inclusive in the consideration of stakeholders. The literature that has focused on decision making under uncertainty, threat, or crisis is nearly unanimous in finding that under such conditions, there is a tendency for decision making to move to the top of the hierarchy in the organization (Dutton, 1986; Greening & Johnson, 1997; Hermann, 1963; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981) . Constriction of decision making to the top levels of the organization tends to create a small group of homogeneous people who have access to fewer perspectives than when a more heterogeneous group is assembled (Greening & Johnson, 1997; Smart & Vertinsky, 1977) .
It is also generally agreed that under conditions of crisis, individuals become limited in their cognitive abilities (Pearson & Clair, 1998; Smart & Vertinsky, 1977; Staw et al., 1981) , access to stakeholders is reduced due to a sense of time limitations (Pearson & Clair, 1998, p. 71 • technical-economic
• human-social § normal/unusual § crisis aspects:
• magnitude of consequences • probability of effect decision makers attend to fewer sources of information (Ashmos et al., 1997; Smart & Vertinsky, 1977) . All of these effects would tend to reduce the decision maker's ability to attend fully to all stakeholders. These limitations on cognitive abilities that occur during crisis and other stressful situations tend to narrow the individual's attention to the most salient issues (D'Aveni & MacMillan, 1990; Kiesler & Sproull, 1982) . Salient issues tend to be those that are unpleasant, deviant, extreme, intense, unusual, or sudden (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982) . These are all threatening issues that will tend to act as catalysts to action by raising the priority of the issue in the mind of the decision maker (Dutton, 1986) . In stakeholder theory, it is the more salient stakeholders to whom decision makers will attend. Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997) presented a descriptive theory of stakeholder salience based on aspects of power, legitimacy, and urgency, and they argued that not all stakeholders will be attended to equally. Managers will give attention to those stakeholders who are perceived as highly salient to the manager. Thus, a stakeholder with power over the firm whose claim is also legitimate will likely be accorded a hearing, whereas a stakeholder whose claim is urgent but who has no power to influence the firm and/or is not perceived as a legitimate claimant may not be heard (Mitchell et al., 1997) . Under conditions of crisis when cognitive limitations take hold and decision making shifts to a small group or a single decision maker at the top, those stakeholders likely to gain the attention of the decision maker will be those with power to influence. This will likely be the case whether the stakeholder's claim is legitimate or not, and even to the point that legitimate stakeholders'claims are not attended to.
Under normal conditions, stakeholder power is salient, and under conditions of crisis the broad array of stakeholders without power may become invisible. In a study of organizational crisis communication, Ulmer and Sellnow (2000) theorized that crisis often leads to greater protection of internal stakeholders at the expense of external stakeholdersperhaps because internal stakeholders become more salient, or because managers are more likely to have developed mental models that include internal stakeholders. Werhane (1999) pointed out that without moral imagination (the ability to consider the norms, social roles, and relationships of a given situation), it can become hard to move outside a mental model (p. 112), so that, again, nonsalient stakeholders can fall from sight. Cognitive limitations and disruptions in stakeholder relationships, combined with the tendency to constrict decision making under uncertainty, produce these effects. To the degree that these effects occur, the ethics of decision making may be lessened, as all stakeholders may not be accorded intrinsic value because they are not salient and/or not recognized.
Additionally, crisis tends to result in a tendency to conserve resources (Mone, McKinley, & Barker, 1998; Staw et al., 1981) and focus on efficiency (Cameron, 1983; D'Aveni, 1989 )-in short, to attend to internal issues at the expense of external environmental factors (D'Aveni & MacMillan, 1990 ) and stakeholders.
These observations lead to our first proposal.
Proposition 1: Ethical decision making will tend to decrease under conditions of crisis.
Stress
We argue that stress is the mechanism by which crises affect the decision maker's capacity to include stakeholders in crisis decisions (see Figure 1) . Stress is increased in various ways by crises. By definition, crises are characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity. Because survival of the organization may be perceived to be in jeopardy during crises (Falkenberg & Herremans, 1995; Nathan & Mitroff, 1991; Shrivastava, 1994) , there is a severe strain on the organization and its individual members (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993) . Crisis may also bring additional pressures from the organization's stakeholders (Greening & Gray, 1994) or bring out new stakeholders that the organization had been unaware of (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992) . Also, during crises, decision makers may feel they have little or no control over the situation (Ashmos et al., 1997; Jackson & Dutton, 1988; Thietart & Forgues, 1997) , and these feelings can result in feelings of reduced responsibility and decisions that are not ethical (see Jensen & Wygant, 1990; Lovell, 2002; Pennington & Schlenker, 1999) .
Most authors agree that the primary psychological effect of crisis is the creation of stress and anxiety in individuals (Staw et al., 1981, p. 505) . According to Smart and Vertinsky (1977) , "The more unfamiliar the event, the greater will be the requirement for adaptation and change to cope with the event, and thus, the greater the level of stress generated" (p. 647). At the same time, the effects brought on by stress create conditions under which the ability of the decision maker or organization to adapt and cope is significantly reduced (Staw et al., 1981) . The narrowing of cognitive processes that tends to occur under crisis and that causes attention to fall on a reduced number of perspectives also causes a perception of increased pressure for decisiveness during a time when the number of alternatives being generated is reduced (Smart & Vertinsky, 1977) . At the individual level, high levels of stress may cause a breakdown in perceptual accuracy and an inability to focus on relevant environmental information 336 BUSINESS & SOCIETY / September 2003 (Milburn, 1972; Smart & Vertinsky, 1977) . Janis and Mann (1977) spoke of the decision maker's tendency when under severe stress to avoid threat cues (pieces of information or actions that are likely to create increased stress because they contradict what the individual believes) through such psychological devices as lack of vigilant search, selective inattention, selective forgetting, distortion of the meaning of warning messages, and construction of wishful rationalizations.
In relation to ethical decision making under conditions of crisis, the effects of stress, both psychological and organizational, reduce the ability of the organization to make effective use of available information and resources, restrict the type and amount of information that is available, limit the cognitive abilities of individual decision makers, and have a negative impact on organizational culture and the ability of people within the organization to interpret the events surrounding it. These effects bear strongly on the ability of decision makers to perceive the needs and claims of various organizational stakeholders. Stress clearly affects decision making in ways that reduce consideration of stakeholder interests. As the focus of attention turns inward, the decision maker may pay less attention to less salient stakeholders in both the internal and external environments, although Ulmer and Sellnow (2000) noted that it would typically be the external stakeholders that are not attended to during crises. Additionally, as stress levels increase, there may be stronger perceptions of time limitations on decisions, which also tends to reduce the organization's access to its external stakeholders (Pearson & Clair, 1998) . Therefore, as levels of stress increase, it is likely that decision makers will attend less to the broad array of stakeholders and will not accord intrinsic value to all stakeholders.
Proposition 2: Ethical decision making under conditions of crisis decreases as the amount of individual and/or organizational stress experienced increases.
Moderating Factors
In this section, we elaborate some critical factors that act as moderators of the process described in our basic framework, either reducing or enhancing the tendency toward unethical decision making in times of crisis. Figure 1 shows a series of event-related factors, organizational factors, and individual factors that can affect the strength of the relationship between crisis, stress, and unethical decision making. These factors will be discussed in turn, and a series of propositions will be developed to explain the expected effects of each.
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Event-related factors. By definition, crises are ambiguous, threatening, complex, and high-impact events that create perceptions of time pressure. Our opening discussion suggests that crises can be identified as onetime crises or ongoing crisis. Frequently, organizations that survive ongoing crisis go through a process of ethical decline and then renewal (Christensen & Kohls, 1998) . As long as decisions are required to be made with speed and unless the organization is provided time to adapt to ongoing crisis, however, it is likely that the stress effects outlined above will occur and the tendency toward unethical decisions will hold. This result could be mediated by some of the organizational factors (organizational structure and availability of slack resources, for example) discussed below (see Figure 1 ).
Proposition 3: There will be no difference between the effects of a single crisis event or an ongoing crisis situation on ethical decision making.
The type of crisis may also influence the response of the organization. Pearson and Mitroff (1993) developed a typology of crisis that places different crisis events on two dimensions. One dimension moves from technical/economic in origin to human/social. The other is from normal everyday events to aberrant or unusual causes. Earlier, Mitroff et al. (1987) had proposed a third crisis dimension: internal or external in origin. Crises perceived to be technical/economic in origin may be addressed in more rational fashion than those with human/social origins for which managers may experience blame. The crisis with an unusual cause may also be handled more easily than one in which the cause is based in everyday operations. Because during crisis there is a tendency for decision makers to focus more on internal operations, a crisis with internal origins will be more likely to be attended to by the decision maker. For these reasons, there may be less stress created and fewer cognitive effects depending on crisis origins, and therefore less of a tendency for unethical decision making to occur.
Borrowing terms from Jones's (1991) discussion of the effect of issue factors on ethical decision making, crises may be characterized according to aspects such as magnitude of consequences, probability of effect, temporal immediacy, proximity, and concentration of effect. Krauss (1999) characterized crisis events on four dimensions: uncertainty, urgency, ambiguity, and complexity. Our definition of crisis makes it clear that crises are high-impact events. Combining Jones's (1991) and Krauss's (1999) terminology for comparative purposes, we can say that crises in general are characterized by high magnitude of consequences, high probability of effect, temporal immediacy or urgency, high uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity. Of course, these factors may vary in degree depending on crisis type, but the variation will probably be only at high levels of each aspect. The degree of perceived crisis is a function of the perceived value of potential loss, its probability, and the pressure of time (Billings et al., 1980) . Proximity and concentration of effect are aspects that will likely affect the perceptions of managers and stakeholders as to whether the situation will be seen as a crisis or merely a problem. Dutton (1986) suggested that the perceived importance, immediacy, and uncertainty of an issue matter in deciding how much of a threat the issue will be. Tjosvold (1984) found that managers who considered situations to be a crisis rather than a minor issue or challenge tended to be more closed-minded and unwilling to engage in information exchange or consider perspectives other than their own. Ashmos et al. (1997) found that when situations were seen as crises, the organizational members who participate in related decisions decrease. These effects would tend to reduce the level of ethical decision making.
Some crisis aspects, such as magnitude of consequences and proximity, will affect an individual's ability to cope with crisis and stress. In work on organizational decline, Mone et al. (1998) noted that factors such as attribution of cause, permanence, or controllability of the event can constrain or facilitate cognitive responses to decline.
Event factors can also affect stakeholders and stakeholder relationships. Jones (1991) defined magnitude of consequences as the sum of the harms or benefits done to victims or beneficiaries of the act (p. 374). The greater the number of stakeholders affected by a decision, and the greater the perceived impact, the more salient the crisis will be to the stakeholder. If the stakeholder has power and legitimacy in addition to urgency (Mitchell et al., 1997) , the event influence will increase in importance to the organization. Each crisis aspect separately may have an effect on ethical decision making, but we also believe that the aspects are additive and interactive in their effect. To capture those effects, we have written just one combined proposition, which would be broken into its various parts in empirical work testing the predictions we are making.
Proposition 5: Ethical decision making in organizations declines as crisis aspects-magnitude of consequences, probability of effect, time urgency, and uncertainty-increase in degree.
Individual factors. Individuals and organizations have varying ways to cope with crises, and these will affect the decision maker's ability to overcome tendencies toward limited cognition and resulting unethical decision practices brought about by stress. Precrisis individual characteristics affect the ability of the manager to handle crisis effectively. There is little research in this area, but the following characteristics (as listed in Figure  1 ) are suggestive of the factors that may be fertile areas to explore.
D 'Aveni and MacMillan (1990) noted that a proclivity to pay more attention to the environment external to the firm improved one's ability to cope with stress; hence, managers of more successful firms were better able to deal with crisis because they were able to attend to a broader array of environmental factors, which enabled better adaptation (p. 635).
Other studies looking at stress and individual decision making have pointed to additional factors influencing decision quality. The need for structure in thinking can result in simplified thinking during stressful situations (Kaplan, Wanshula, & Zanna, 1993 ). Perceptions of time pressures limit individuals' ability to think in terms of more complex relationships, so people fall back on stereotypical thinking and tend to focus on one thing. People with a high need for structure or certainty are more likely to use existing stereotypes in decision making under stress (Kaplan et al., 1993) . This kind of cognitive framing can limit the amount of information an individual considers in making a decision (Key, 1997) .
Uncertainty may have different effects on individuals depending on whether they are normally time urgent or non-timeurgent (Rastegary & Landy, 1993) . Time-urgent individuals are able to deal more effectively with the pressures of time because they are more sensitized to such pressure, whereas non-timeurgent individuals will react by trying to avoid time-pressured situations or repressing their awareness (Rastegary & Landy, 1993 ).
An individual's degree of state versus action orientation can also influence his or her ability to make good decisions under the pressure of time (Stiensmeier-Pelster & Schurmann, 1993) . Action-oriented individuals tend to look to the future and can weigh alternative actions, whereas stateoriented individuals tend to look to the past. The latter tend to be less adaptable to change and to react to pressure by accelerating the processing of information, which can result in greater inaccuracy in decisions compared to those made by action-oriented individuals (Stiensmeier-Pelster & Schurmann, 1993) . Thomas, Clark, and Gioia (1993) argued that sensemaking can make a difference-whether or not an individual perceives events as threats. Dutton (1986) noted that the perceived importance, temporal immediacy, and degree of uncertainty surrounding an event determine whether the event will be seen as a threat or not. If events are seen as threats rather than opportunities, it is more likely that the number of alternative courses of actions considered will decline (Staw et al., 1981) , the tendency to oversimplify situations will increase (Thomas et al., 1993, p. 240) , and fewer sources of information will be relied on (Smart & Vertinsky, 1977) . Individuals who tend to be more optimistic perceivers will be likely to exhibit stronger coping abilities when confronted with crisis than will those who are more pessimistic in their outlook. The growing literature on prospect theory and escalation of commitment may be relevant here. Escalation of commitment characterizes situations in which individuals continue in a course of action that has not been successful (Rutledge, 1994; Street & Anthony, 1997) , often beyond what the facts of the situation would justify (Whyte, 1986) . Prospect theory applies positive and negative framing to escalation decisions (Whyte, 1986) , so that it matters if decisions are framed in a positive manner (i.e., the individual perceives himself or herself as capable of achieving the goal) rather than in a negative manner (Rutledge, 1994) . When framed positively, individuals were more likely to discontinue a failing course of action (Rutledge, 1994) . Janis and Mann (1977) had suggested that when people encounter new threats, the level of decisional stress that results depends on the degree to which the individual is committed to a prior course of action (p. 50). The way in which an individual is disposed to frame perceptions, then, can effect the level of stress felt during crises.
Another area has to do with ability to see a crisis in new ways. Because crises are subjective, or perceived, as well as objective, individual capability to expand perception will affect the ability to cope with crisis (Milburn et al., 1983) . Personal characteristics such as knowledge, attitudes, and behavioral and cognitive skills are thought to influence perceptions of the situation and ability to cope (Kontogiannis, 1996, p. 77) . Key (1997) noted that discretion-the power to act-relies on a belief that the individual can control a situation. Feelings of control can reduce stress. The ability to cope with stress may also be related to individual perceptions of the demands of the situation and the individual's perception of personal ability to balance those demands-these perceptions may be mediated by job requirements and social support at work (Kontogiannis, 1996) . Finally, if the decision maker is able to rethink perceptions and beliefs, stress can be reduced (Billings et al., 1980) . Individuals with differing perceptions, who see effects differently, define crises. As Billings et al. (1980) noted, "Crisis resides in the person as well as in the situation" (p. 306). As we noted for Proposition 5, each individual factor may independently influence ethical decision making, but we believe the factors are additive and interactive, so we have again written the proposition in a combination form in hopes that empirical work will uncover the various influences captured by the proposition.
Proposition 6: Individuals who normally attend to environment, have less need for structure, are time urgent, are action oriented, perceive events as opportunities, and are able to rethink perceptions will have lower levels of stress and be more likely to make ethical decisions during crisis.
There is in the ethics literature a large body of work on cognitive moral development and its effect on ethical decision making that draws on the work of Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg (1969) and has been the basis of a number of models of ethical decision making (Ferrell, Gresham, & Fraedrich, 1989; Jones, 1991; Rest, 1984; Trevino, 1986) . A great deal of conceptual and empirical research has been done, and most researchers have found that cognitive moral development does have a mediating role in ethical decision making (Fraedrich, Thorne, & Ferrell, 1994; Ho, Vitell, Barnes, & Desborde, 1997) . Piaget (1932) proposed a 2-stage model of a child's development of moral reasoning, and Kohlberg (1969) expanded his work to a 6-stage model of individual moral development. Persons at lower stages of moral development would be less able to recognize complex relationships found in ethical decision making than those at the highest levels (Goolsby & Hunt, 1992 ) and would therefore be less able to judge what is morally right (Trevino, 1992) . Those who adhere to this cognitive model would argue that, unless one can make moral judgments, one cannot take moral action. This link has not, however, been found to be strong (Blasi, 1980; Jones & Ryan, 1998; Trevino, 1992) . Researchers have proposed various mediating factors to close this link: moral identity (Blasi, 1980) , moral responsibility (Harrington, 1997) , moral approbation (Jones & Ryan, 1998) , and moral imagination (Werhane, 1999) . These lines of research may help in mediating the crisis-stress relationship but are not developed sufficiently to date to make predictions here.
The predictions from cognitive moral development theory are contradictory as they relate to crisis and stress effects. On the one hand, Kohlberg (1969) would predict that those who are at higher levels of cognitive moral development would be better able to reject any situational pressures and use their internalized principles in making the ethical decision (Goolsby & Hunt, 1992; James, 2000) . Trevino (1992) , however, reported that several researchers have found that managers-who would be expected to be at higher levels of moral development based on age (Weber & Wasieleski, 2001 ) and experience-generally use lower levels of moral judgment in their business decisions (p. 450). Furthermore, she noted (1992) that individuals whose job allows them to hear and consider the perspectives of others and resolve moral conflicts (something a higher level decision maker would be expected to do) would be expected to operate at higher levels of moral development (p. 454). Ho et al. (1997) noted that at higher levels in the organization, higher stage decision makers are more likely to exhibit role stress resulting from conflicts between their ethical principles and the necessity to achieve corporate goals. If it is true that high-level organizational decision makers operate at high stages of cognitive moral development, we would predict that they would be less likely to suffer the effects of crisis-related stress and more likely to make ethical decisions. The literature is not, however, clear as to whether these decision makers indeed are at higher stages of moral development, or, if they are, whether they use that principled reasoning in their business decisions (Fraedrich et al., 1994; Weber & Wasieleski, 2001 ). It seems a reasonable prediction from the theory of cognitive moral development that individuals at higher stages of moral reasoning would, however, be more capable of overcoming the effects of stress.
Proposition 7: Individuals at higher stages of cognitive moral development are more likely to make ethical decisions in crisis situations.
Organizational factors. Organizations as well as individuals have varying capacities to handle crisis that both affect and are affected by stress levels (see Figure 1) . At the organizational level, the capacity to deal with crisis is related to the organization's level of uncommitted resources (slack), its ability to use those resources, and the corporate culture. With low levels of available slack in the organization, there is less innovative capacity in the organization, which reduces its ability to adapt to change (Mone et al., 1998; Staw et al., 1981) . Crisis tends to place burdens on the financial and physical resources of the firm (Dutton, 1986; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993) , which can increase organizational stress. A current example of such a situation is the bankruptcy of United Airlines that was at least partially caused by the September 11 catastrophe but was worsened because the company did not have the slack resources to overcome the stresses caused by that crisis.
The ability of an organization to use what resources are available to it is affected by the cognitive limitations on individuals cited above and by the changes in information processing and organizational structure that occur during conditions of crisis. Husted (1993) suggested that for ethical decision making to occur, organizations must have decision-making structures in place that allow decision makers to balance stakeholder needs. Yet in crisis, organization structure changes (Staw et al., 1981) , tending to restrict information flows (in part by constricting decision making to a few top people and in part by reducing the number of channels of information being accessed) (Mone et al., 1998) during crisis situations. These effects reduce the number of viable alternatives available to organizations during conditions of crisis and therefore restrict organizations'ability to make the best use of resources. These effects are compounded when they affect the corporate culture.
An organization's culture contains its basic ethical assumptions concerning what is right, proper, and fair. These assumptions act as unconscious guides for ethical decision making within the organization (Fritzsche, 1991; Gottlieb & Sanzgiri, 1996; Sims, 1992; Trevino, 1986) and can provide understood means for coping with situations (Upchurch, 1998 ). Trevino's (1986) person-situation model of ethical decision making included job context, work characteristics, and organizational culture, and Fritzsche (1991) stated, "Of course, actual behavior is influenced by the culture of the organization" (p. 842). Organizational factors mediate personal values (Fritzsche, 1991) and level of moral development (Trevino, 1986) , and organizational culture influences the ethical decisions made in organizations (Loe, Ferrell, & Mansfield, 2000) . The socialpolitical literature on crisis and decline suggests that crises may arise when there are gaps between the shared meanings in the organization and its reality (Turner, 1976) . These shared meanings are the basis for an organization's sensemaking-how it interprets information in its environment (Thomas et al., 1993) . When the shared meanings break down, it becomes difficult for members of the organization to interpret events, and stress levels may then increase. Research also suggests that as the crisis effects continue, organizations are likely to experience internal leadership crises and "cultural norm crises," in which members of the organization will require a transformation in the culture and leadership of the organization (Pearson & Clair, 1998) .
The social network approach to decision making offers another factor to consider in examining the tendency of an organization in crisis conditions to narrow the range of stakeholders attended to by managers by affecting the culture. The social network perspective attempts to bridge individual and organizational factors in ethical decision making through examination of the strength or weakness of social relationships as predictors of ethical behavior (Brass, Butterfield, & Skaggs, 1998) . Social network theory suggests that managers, during crisis events and especially in organizations in crisis, are more prone to unethical behavior because the changed conditions result in the destruction of social relationships. Crisis tends to disrupt the social relationships that have been built up within the organization over time and tends to weaken previously strong relationships. Granovetter (1973) saw relationship strength as dependent on the frequency, reciprocity, emotional intensity, and intimacy of the relationship. As the organization enters into crisis conditions, these factors would often change, sometimes abruptly. According to Brass et al. (1998) , unethical behavior is less likely when relationships are strong, because such relationships foster empathy and psychological proximity, conditions that constrain individuals from acting unethically. When such ties are weakened or cut, as under crisis conditions, it could lead to further reductions in the number of stakeholders considered in decision making and to individuals feeling fewer constraints on their behavior as shared norms break down.
Coping is one component in Shrivastava's (1993) suggested framework of crisis and refers to methods that organizations use to respond to a crisis. Pearson and Clair (1998) applied these methods to various organizational crisis literatures. For example, psychological views on crisis would suggest that coping mechanisms would involve cognitive readjustments through organizational support systems (Pearson & Clair, 1998, p. 63) , whereas social-political theorists might look for collective behaviors that could reverse the breakdown in shared meanings that is a consequence of crisis. Hall and Mansfield (1971) theorized that in the early stages of organizational stress, there will be increased emphasis on attaining organizational goals, even at the expense of stakeholder needs. This does suggest that after a crisis, organizations will eventually adapt and replace old practices and relationships with new ones (Pearson & Clair, 1998, p. 64) . Evidence for such a result is seen in work on organizational change. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) suggested that resistance to organizational change comes mainly from the organization's normative embeddedness in its institutional context (p. 1023); under conditions of crisis, however, the normative structure of the organization may break down, and demands for transformational leadership may come (Pearson & Clair, 1998) . Whether change will occur depends on the organization's capacity for action, and according to Greenwood and Hinings (1996) , experience increases capacity for action (p. 1040). Weick (1988) noted that in crisis, people tend to see those things they have capacity to control and change. He argued that this relationship between capacity and change is crucial to Christensen / ETHICAL DECISION MAKING 345 effective crisis management. In addition, increased capacity due to crisis preparation or a strongly ethical organization culture and leadership may mitigate the tendency for crisis to increase stress and reduce ethical decision making.
Crisis management techniques can help ensure that decisions made under crisis conditions are more ethical. The literature suggests that organizations should plan for crisis to minimize the effects of surprise (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993) . Billings et al. (1980) discussed the differences in effect between anticipated and surprise events, and they suggested that surprise events are more likely than anticipated events to cause a stress reaction and a perception of greater crisis because there is less time in which to search for solutions. Planning will also tend to lower stress levels and avert some of the dangers of cognitive limitations under crisis conditions. The same result may occur when organizations make sure to establish clear and open information channels and work to keep them open during crisis. The crisis management literature also recommends that permanent crisis management teams be formed in advance and that a broad range of perspectives be included on those teams (Greening & Johnson, 1997; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993; Weick, 1988) . Finally, the literature suggests that decision makers should pay attention to their organizational culture and create a culture that encourages dialogue and dissent (Gottlieb & Sanzgiri, 1996) to ensure a variety of perspectives and to guard against the narrowing of cognitive abilities that tends to occur in crisis conditions. According to Pearson, Clair, Misra, and Mitroff (1997) , "Managing crisis requires a coordinated, full-blown, multifunctional effort. In the best cases, organizations facing crisis situations are guided by values that are deeply ingrained in their cultures" (p. 51). All of these suggestions, if implemented, can help to strengthen ethical decision making under conditions of crisis and result in more successful organizational responses to crises. Once again, we have written all of the organizational aspects into one proposition, although each aspect could separately influence ethical decision making. We believe that these aspects are also additive and interactive, and we hope that empirical work will uncover the various relationships captured in the proposition.
Proposition 8: Organizations characterized by slack resources, a flexible organizational structure, strong culture, strong social relationships, good coping strategies, and crisis planning will make fewer unethical decisions during crises.
In addition to the influences previously discussed, our framework includes a feedback loop. We theorize that unethical decision making will 346 BUSINESS & SOCIETY / September 2003 actually worsen crisis situations, contribute to further stress, and further weaken the organization's capacity to act ethically. Support for this proposition can be found in chaos theory and in the literature on escalation of commitment. Chaos theory suggests that actors, through their actions, create their own context, and in crisis situations, the context that is created is not one the actor can control (Thietart & Forgues, 1997) . The result is that crises may be actually created by actors when they attempt to act to control previous crisis situations. Chaos theory is a radical extension of notions about sensemaking, whereby meanings that are created through framing or labeling of events bias action into a particular direction (Thomas et al., 1993) . Staw et al. (1981) noted that once a situation is perceived as a threat, the number of alternatives considered is reduced (see also Tjosvold, 1984 ). If unethical decisions are then made, the situation may worsen, conflict may increase, and the cognitive effects of the increased stress will feed back to worsen the crisis (Hermann, 1963; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993) .
Research in the escalation of commitment literature strengthens our proposition as well. A crisis in itself is likely to create a negative frame within the organization. Jensen and Wygant (1990) noted that individuals act based on how they anticipate the future and not necessarily because of past or present situations. In studies of escalation of commitment, however, it has been found that individuals act differently depending on how they view previous actions, so that under some circumstances, individuals will continue with failing courses of action in spite of evidence that the future does not look good. Ross and Staw (1993) proposed that four sets of forces come into play in escalation situations: Project, psychological, social, and organizational factors determine whether escalation will occur. Among the psychological determinants was a "reinforcement trap," in which leaders continue in a failing course of action because they have a successful history of turning bad situations around (Street & Anthony, 1997) , which is exacerbated by cognitive errors that lead individuals to bias new information in the direction of previously accepted preferences (Ross & Staw, 1993, p. 716) . This bias can become a psychological commitment to a course of action (Barton, Duchon, & Dunegan, 1989) , particularly when the decision maker is personally responsible for making the initial (wrong) decision because he or she will then be motivated to justify the earlier decision (Lant & Hurley, 1999) .
This theorized need to justify past behavior has been supplemented in the escalation literature by prospect theory, which proposes that the ways in which prior situations have been framed determine whether individuals will escalate commitment to a failing course of action (Brockner, 1992) . Christensen / ETHICAL DECISION MAKING 347 The manner in which information is presented affects decision choices (Rutledge, 1994) . Rutledge (1994) found that individuals who were responsible for earlier decisions were more inclined to escalate, but the inclination could be reduced if information was framed positively. In crisis situations, however, it is not likely that information will be framed positively, and time pressures may make it impossible to be clear about the success or failure of the previous decisions. Janis and Mann (1977) noted that when new threats are encountered, the degree of stress the decision maker will feel depends on the degree to which the decision maker is committed to a previous course of action. Prospect theory would then predict that because the previous decisions are framed negatively, the sunk cost effect will come into play, and the decision maker will tend to continue the failing course (Street & Anthony, 1997; Whyte, 1986) . Unethical decision making would likely result as long as the factors contributing to escalation have a higher priority than ethical concerns in the decision maker's mind (Street, Robertson, & Geiger, 1997) . proposed that the longer the escalation situation continues, the more viable unethical alternatives may seem; they also state, however, that some individuals will not choose unethically even in the face of escalation situations. D' Aveni and MacMillan (1990) , on the other hand, argued that one must conclude from the literature on stress that managers of successful firms pay more attention to the external environment of their organization, whereas managers of failing firms react in maladaptive ways to stressful situations. Furthermore, Falkenberg and Herremans (1995) found that in crisis situations, individuals based decisions on what they thought was necessary to survive, whether it was ethical or not. We think that the escalation literature as a whole supports our proposition that when crisis leads to unethical decisions, the organization is likely to escalate its commitment to the unethical.
Proposition 9: When crisis leads to unethical decision making, it is frequently followed by further unethical decision making.
ETHICAL DECISION MAKING: THE CRISIS FRAMEWORK AND JONES'S ISSUE CONTINGENT MODEL
The literature on ethical decision making includes work that addresses individual characteristics and organization factors in explaining unethical decision making in organizations. Recently, there have been attempts to understand the interaction between individual and organizational factors 348 BUSINESS & SOCIETY / September 2003 (Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; Trevino, 1986) . Trevino (1986) , for example, proposed a model that explained ethical decision making in organizations as interactions of personality, work, and organizational characteristics. In 1991, Jones developed an issue-contingent model of ethical decision making that synthesized prior models and is acknowledged as the most comprehensive model of ethical decision making to date (Loe et al., 2000; . Because both Jones's (1991) model and ours add external factors (issue in his case, crisis in ours), we will briefly compare our framework of ethical decision making in crisis with Jones's issue-contingent model of ethical decision making. Although we believe that the results of this comparison will point out some fertile areas of research, we do acknowledge that Jones uses a different definition of ethical decision than we do, which might account for some of the differences we see below.
Jones (1991) based his synthesis on Rest's (1984) 4-stage model of moral decision making: Recognize a moral issue, make a moral judgment, establish moral intent, and engage in moral behavior. He then proposed the construct, moral intensity, as an independent variable affecting all four stages. Moral intensity captures six characteristics of the moral issue itself: magnitude of consequences, social consensus, probability of effect, temporal immediacy, proximity, and concentration of effect. Jones described in detail how these issue characteristics affect each of the stages of ethical decision making. He proposed that greater moral intensity leads to more ethical decision making, defined as decisions that are legally and morally acceptable to the larger community. We believe that crisis is similar in nature to moral intensity; therefore, it should be instructive to compare predicted effects on ethical decision making.
We noted earlier, in our section on event-related factors, that crisis by definition encompasses three of the six factors comprising the moral intensity construct: magnitude of consequences, probability of effect, and temporal immediacy. Crisis involves the probability of severe losses that threaten the viability of the organization. The magnitude of the consequences ranges from high to very high in crisis. When a crisis occurs, the probability of serious effects becomes more likely even though many of the consequences may still be uncertain. Although temporal urgency is not always objectively present in crisis, there is always a perception of time pressure and a belief that decisions must be made quickly-temporal immediacy. Proximity, concentration of effect, and social consensus may all vary with the situation and depend on whether the crisis originates in the natural environment or is human induced, and on the breadth of primary and secondary stakeholders who will be affected.
At Stage 1 of Jones's (1991) moral decision process, recognition that a moral issue exists, moral intensity increases attention through salience and vividness (p. 380). Crisis heightens these effects but also causes selective attention and reduces the cues attended to by the decision maker. Furthermore, according to Jones's model, at this stage not only must the decision maker recognize that there are moral aspects to the decision, but he or she must also recognize the potential for choice. But the cognitive effects of crisis tend to lead to the individual's perception that he or she is not in control of the situation and that there are few alternatives available, thereby limiting the perception that there is choice. We conclude that some factors resulting from crisis contribute to moral awareness, but some tend to reduce it.
At Stage 2 in the decision process, making the moral judgment, the decision maker is called on to apply a moral reasoning process to the issue at hand. Jones (1991, p. 385) concluded that issues with high moral intensity could elicit reasoning processes at higher stages of moral development. We have seen, however, in the crisis literature that although stress does tend to lead to more simplified reasoning and to the use of fewer and closer information sources, these stress responses do not necessarily result in a higher level of reasoning. They are just as likely to result in decision pathologies (Janis & Mann, 1977) . Jones (1991) referred to a study by Taylor (1975) that suggested that when the magnitude of consequences increases, people spend more time and gather more information when making decisions. Jones believed that this provides further support for his view that high moral intensity leads to higher levels of moral reasoning. Again, crisis situations may be an exception because the urgency of crisis will demand efficiency in reasoning and will likely lead to more simplified and adequate decisions rather than to more sophisticated decisions. External cues may be more important in crisis than internal evaluations. There is, however, no specific research to address either Jones's proposition or ours.
Stage 3 calls for establishment of moral intent on the part of the decision maker-that a decision be made to act morally in this situation. The decision maker's ability to do this, according to Jones (1991) , is affected by proximity and social consensus-proximity through perceptions of control and social consensus through peer pressure to act according to the consensus. Jones concluded that perceptions of control and social consensus would be greater and thus the establishment of moral intent would be more frequent with issues of high moral intensity. Crisis situations, however, tend to alter the perceptions of control, thereby countering the positive effects of proximity. And, under conditions of crisis, fewer sources of information are attended to (Fiske & Taylor, 1984) , which affects the ability of the decision maker to be knowledgeable about any consensus surrounding the situation. So both factors leading to moral intensity may be neutralized, and the establishment of moral intent in times of crisis becomes more uncertain.
Finally, at Stage 4, the decision maker acts in a moral way. Jones (1991) argued that the effects of greater proximity will positively influence a person's ability to move from moral intent to moral action. With proximity, knowledge of the situation increases while psychological distance decreases, and individuals are more likely to engage in helping behavior. Although we agree that those stakeholders who are more proximate may be more likely to have their needs addressed, it is also likely that in crisis, stakeholders who are not as close may be ignored. But we have argued that an ethical decision is one in which all stakeholders are accorded intrinsic value, so the effects of crisis would tend to neutralize the positive effects of proximity. In crisis, the feeling of proximity may be limited to certain stakeholders. Responding only to those stakeholders would be unethical.
It might be thought that a way to remove the inconsistency between our and Jones's propositions would be to suggest that some moral issues in a crisis are attended to due to their moral intensity but that others are not. We recognize that in ordinary discourse, an event may include many moral issues, but this use would appear to be a misunderstanding of Jones's concept of moral issue. According to Jones, the moral issue is not different than the concrete situation. It is the situation/issue that has moral intensity and components such as proximity, urgency, and probability of effect. The crisis event is the moral issue. Therefore, the inconsistencies between Jones's and our predictions remain. Greater or more frequent recognition of moral concerns, sophisticated moral judgment, and more frequent formation of moral intent and ethical action would often not accurately describe decision making in crisis situations. Jones's (1991) article has usefully directed scholars to look at the influence of moral intensity on moral recognition, judgment, intent, and behavior. Crisis situations, however, present cases of high moral intensity in which Jones's expectation of a positive impact is not seen or is reversed. This suggests a fertile area for study. How do moral intensity and crisis actually affect aspects of moral decisions and behavior?
RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the framework we have presented has face validity and is consistent with current literature on crisis and crisis management, it has little direct empirical support, and we have seen that there are contradictions in the predictions our framework would make and those made by Christensen / ETHICAL DECISION MAKING 351 Jones's (1991) model. We suggest two research approaches to test the propositions developed for this article. The first is archival research to examine whether the experience of organizations is consistent with the propositions. We are aware of poor and apparently unethical decisions, as we have defined them, following a number of crises: the Valdez oil spill (Exxon), the Bhopal tragedy (Union Carbide), the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, and the Jack in the Box problems with the e-coli outbreak. There are also examples of apparently ethical decisions such as Johnson & Johnson's response to the Tylenol poisoning incidents. If appropriate information could be retrieved from either corporate documents or interviews with decision participants, one could determine whether the experience in these cases and others is consistent with the proposed framework.
A second approach would be to use laboratory simulations. Both computer and behavioral simulations are promising. In a computer simulation, subjects would be asked to make periodic decisions in running a company, similar to some strategic management simulations currently available (see Weber, 1997 , for example). Subjects would be able to inquire about and find information related to the decisions. A crisis event could be inserted into the decision stream, and inquiries and decisions would be observed under different conditions. Also, simulations could be observed through use of a "management team" that communicated via archived e-mail messages. Decision-making processes and changes in team dynamics could thus be observed and analyzed.
A behavioral approach might be used to include conditions of deepening crisis in behavioral simulations and role-plays (see Bezold, Wokutch, & Gerde, 1997, for example) . Information can be brought in on an occasional basis that calls for immediate action on an unexpected occurrence. If two or more teams are operating on the same simulation, differences between the teams' decisions and the decision-making processes can be highlighted and compared in the debriefing period. Participants can be questioned about their reactions to the crisis and asked for their ideas about what factors might have changed the decisions that were made in the simulation.
The advantage of computer and behavioral simulations is that components of the framework can be isolated for testing. Perhaps the easiest to explore would be the impact of individual characteristics. We have not mentioned survey methods to gather information from organizations that have experienced crisis. There are the usual problems with self-reporting, but in the absence of better tools this kind of information can be helpful. The database gathered by the USC Center for Crisis Management could be a beginning point for further exploration of factors affecting ethical decision making. The results should prove helpful to guide managers to make more ethical decisions during times of crisis.
CONCLUSION
Organizations must face and cope with crisis, actions that are best understood in terms of the firm's expanding network of stakeholder relationships. A critical aspect of coping with crisis is the loss of or preservation of ethical decision making. Our review of the literature has pointed to unethical decision making that often occurs in times of crisis. Our framework proposes relationships between crisis, stress, and ethical/unethical decision making and the moderating effects of event, individual, and organizational factors. The threats to ethical decision making are articulated in nine propositions. This framework provides a foundation for theoretical discussion, a conversation we have initiated through presentation of our proposals and a brief comparison of predictions based on our framework and on Jones's (1991) model of ethical decision making. We believe that, as the framework and propositions are refined, testable hypotheses can be developed and empirical work performed that will help organizations ensure that they are able to maintain the ethics of their decision making under crisis conditions.
